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THE THREE AGES OF
LEGISLATION PEDAGOGY
William N. Eskridge, Jr. *
I would like to thank the New York University School of Law
and its Journal of Legislation and Public Policy for hosting this sym-
posium. Typical of N.Y.U. events, the organizers have been uni-
formly helpful and efficient.
I'd like to think about Rick Pildes's excellent question about the
history of this pedagogy. Rick really hit the nail on the head in his
comments about the rise and fall and the subsequent resurgence of the
field of legislation.
I would divide the history of legislation pedagogy into three eras.
The first is the period between the two world wars. In the 1920s and
30s, schools like N.Y.U. offered some promising legislation courses.
This topic was exciting for many law professors because lawyers and
law professors were beginning to realize that statutes are the primary
source of law in the modem regulatory state. The most sophisticated
courses were those developed by scholars such as Frederick de Sloo-
verel at N.Y.U., Walter Gellhom2 at Columbia, and Lloyd Garrison 3
and Willard Hurst4 at Wisconsin. They developed case studies of reg-
ulatory structures and the legal and constitutional restrictions and em-
powerments for those regulatory structures. The first conceptually
sophisticated materials on legislation were the Garrison and Hurst
materials at the University of Wisconsin, which provided both a theo-
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1. See, e.g., Frederick J. de Sloovere, Analytical Jurisprudence as Related to Mod-
em Legal Methods, 7 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 88 (1929-1930); Frederick J. de Sloovere,
Contextual Interpretation of Statutes, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 219 (1936); Frederick J. de
Sloovere, Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes, 10 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. !
(1932-1933).
2. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn & Seymour L. Linfield, Administrative Adjudication
of Contract Disputes: The Walsh-Healey Act, 37 MICH. L. REV. 841 (1938-1939).
3. See, e.g., Lloyd K. Garrison, The Power of Congress over Corporate Reorgani-
zations, 19 VA. L. REV. 343 (1932-1933); Lloyd K. Garrison, Reorganization of Rail-
roads Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 71 (1933-1934).
4. See, e.g., Willard Hurst, Who Is the "Great" Appellate Judge?, 24 IND. L.J. 394
(1948-1949); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS (1950); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN, 1836-1915 (1964).
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retical and a practical legal, regulatory, and economic analysis of state
and federal law on workplace insurance.5 This first era of legislation
pedagogy was an experimental era that coincided with the genesis of
theoretical and practical thinking about the emerging modem regula-
tory state.
The second era, running from the 1940s to the 1970s, was a pe-
riod of classical thinking and false starts. Harvard's Henry Hart, one
of the most brilliant law professors of the century, hijacked the legisla-
tion course at Harvard and turned it into a legal process course. The
legal process course, as Hart understood it, was mainly about judging.
The course drew very little from theories of legislation, practices of
legislatures, or advanced thinking about administration, but had a
great deal to say about theories of judging-especially common law
judging and statutory interpretation judging, and less about constitu-
tional judging. Hart and his coauthor, Al Sacks, developed a compre-
hensive set of materials that were the foundational documents in the
legal education of thousands of law students from the 1950s through
the 1970s; the high points of Hart and Sacks's legal process materials
were chapters one and seven, which systematically treated statutory
interpretation in the modem administrative state. 6 These materials
were widely influential among lawyers, law professors, and judges,
and to a certain extent contributed to the death of legislation as an
exciting area of law. Hart and Sacks killed legislation for almost a
generation because their now classic materials reflected the nineteenth
century's focus on judicial decision making, rather than the more re-
cent focus on legislative and administrative decision making.
In the 1960s, constitutional law drew the most ambitious public
law scholars away from legislation, and student activism rendered stu-
dent bodies that were basically uninterested in the judge-centered
methodology that Henry Hart and some of his colleagues believed to
be the epitome of legal thought. In the 1970s, when Phil Frickey and I
were in law school, legislation was basically a dead area of legal aca-
demic inquiry. Legislation courses were still taught at some law
schools, but they were like the living dead-zombies of legal
pedagogy.
The 1980s inaugurated a third era, the brightest of them all. This
decade saw a resurgence of interest in legislation as a topic worth
studying and teaching at law schools. There are three things that con-
5. LAW IN SOCIETY: A COURSE DESIGNED FOR UNDERGRADUATES AND BEGINNING
LAW STUDENTS (Lloyd K. Garrison & Willard Hurst eds., rev. ed. 1941).
6. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 1958).
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tributed to this legislation renaissance, in addition to the obvious and
overwhelming importance of the topic in our "Age of Statutes." The
first thing that contributed to the renaissance is the flip side of what
Rick says undermined legislation as a topic of study in the 1960s: law
professor and student interest in civil rights. By the 1980s, it was
clear that the modern administrative state not only molds and manages
the economy, but also debates and sets rules that protect the civil
rights of women and minorities. For most of us today, the most criti-
cal civil rights protections are those found in legislation-not those
found in federal or state constitutions. This is particularly true for
people with disabilities, 7 pregnant women, 8 and lesbians, gay men,
and bisexuals. 9 By the 1980s, the excitement that previously had gal-
vanized student and professor interest in constitutional law was also
invigorating legislation, as so much of the action was transferred
there.
A second contributing factor to the legislation renaissance was
the constitutionalization of democracy, which was also one of the rea-
sons for the decline of the older legal process approach. Before the
1980s, lawyers and judges were turning issues of democratic process
into issues of constitutional rights. Examples of the exciting develop-
ments of the time included vote dilution cases such as Baker v. Carr10
and Gomillion v. Lighfoot,II not to mention the Voting Rights Act of
1965; 12 a generation of campaign finance cases including Buckley v.
Valeo;13 and challenges to state initiatives and referenda retracting
rights from racial or sexual minorities. 14 Even some issues arising out
of the operation of Congress became constitutionalized-most notori-
ously, the House's expulsion of Representative Adam Clayton Pow-
ell.15 These and other areas of constitutional inquiry not only
deepened the excitement law professors and students felt toward legis-
lation, but also stimulated interest in normative theories of political
representation and equity.
Third, legislation was invigorated by fresh, exciting theories
about the legislative and political process, including economic-based
7. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
8. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
9. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S. 1705, 108th Cong. (2003).
10. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
11. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
12. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
13. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
14. E.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
15. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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theories such as public choice, as well as more traditional pluralistic
theories of the political process. Just as a new generation of Ameri-
cans was growing up cynical about government, there was a body of
public choice theory waiting to be mined, deployed, and argued over.
Public choice theory infused a fair amount of conceptual excitement
into issues such as statutory interpretation, campaign finance, lobby-
ing, and political and legal process.
When Phil Frickey and I were in private practice together in the
early 1980s, we were both astounded that our legal educations had so
little connection with the most interesting intellectual work we were
doing, namely, statutory interpretation. We concluded that the neglect
of legislation was one of the greatest oversights in legal education, but
presented a great opportunity for us. Accordingly, we agreed to au-
thor a casebook once we were both ensconced in teaching positions.
Inspired by the three things that were stimulating new interest in legis-
lation, we had some good ideas about how the casebook should be
constructed; it should capitalize on the codification of civil rights pro-
tections, the constitutionalization of the political process, and the new
public choice thinking.16
Our first big decision was to start our legislation materials with a
case study of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 We started with the
fascinating sociological, political, and legislative struggle that pre-
ceded this new kind of statute, which we felt students would find very
interesting. We then used the Act as a basis for illustrating positive
and normative theories about the legislative process and for demon-
strating how statutes evolve as agencies and courts apply them over
time. The culmination of the chapter was United Steelworkers v.
Weber,' 8 the affirmative action case, which was doctrinally compli-
cated, theoretically interesting, and normatively complex. To our sur-
prise, Weber has been an enduring introduction to statutory
interpretation; it remains relevant in the new century as a hot button
issue for constitutional statutory law. Abner Mikva and Eric Lane,
who produced a subsequent legislation book, had what we thought
was also an excellent idea. Their case example was the Voting Rights
Act, 19 which is another great example of a statutory case study that
16. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1st ed. 1988).
17. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.); see ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 16, at 1-36.
18. 443 U.S. 193 (1979); see ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 16, at 65-93.
19. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.); see ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 101-41 (1997).
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
[Vol. 7:3
HeinOnline  -- 7 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 6 2003-2004
2003] THE THREE AGES OF LEGISLATION PEDAGOGY 7
combines the political process, constitutional issues, and very interest-
ing issues of statutory interpretation, including the relationship be-
tween administrative and judicial interpretation.
The second thing that Phil and I did was to introduce a lot of
theory, particularly public choice theory, but also deliberative theories
of politics. We introduced them in chapter one and carried them
through the rest of the book. Our third decision was to capitalize on
the interesting constitutional dimensions of the electoral and represen-
tative process. Thus, we explored the doctrines, theories, and consti-
tutional features of United States elections, the legislative process, and
lobbying. Those chapters really didn't come into full fruition until we
were joined by Beth Garrett,20 who actually participated in the legisla-
tive process, although we did make an initial effort early on.
Our legislation casebook was a modest market success and was
followed by several others. More importantly, however, it was fol-
lowed by materials compiled by other professors teaching similar
courses-much like the Hurst and Garrison materials of the 1930s and
1940s.2 The widespread practice of putting together one's own pho-
tocopied materials has made this a particularly dynamic field, even
though most compilations have not actually been published. Legisla-
tion courses therefore have grown like weeds in a vacant lot in the last
twenty years, and most law schools, particularly the major ones, now
offer at least one course in legislation. Some law schools, notably
Georgetown, offer not just one course, but instead an entire program
in legislation.
The most popular format for an introductory legislation course is
one that surveys the electoral process, the legislative process and di-
rect democracy, statutory interpretation, and administration. But other
formats are also working with great success:
1. Statutory Interpretation. Many courses focus on statutory in-
terpretation, including the course I have taught at Georgetown,
N.Y.U., Vanderbilt, Yale, Toronto, Stanford, Virginia, Harvard, and
Columbia. In three credit hours, I find that I am barely able to cover
the theories, canons, and practice of statutory interpretation. I used to
teach a more comprehensive course that included political and repre-
sentative process materials, but recently I have focused on statutory
interpretation, with the political theory and drafting materials in our
book tied closely to that topic. Statutory interpretation is both theoret-
20. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETr, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
(3d ed. 2001).
21. LAW IN SOCIETY, supra note 5.
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ically interesting to my students and to myself, and is incredibly prac-
tical because almost all of what young lawyers do is statutory
interpretation. And yet most law schools still give students an over-
dose of common law learning and a ridiculously small amount of stat-
utory interpretation learning. This is great for Frickey, Garrett, and
Eskridge, because it sells books that students keep, but it's bad for
students. In fact, it's a pedagogical scandal.
2. Regulation of a Substantive Area. A second kind of legisla-
tion course examines the interaction of different lawmaking and law-
implementing mechanisms that enable the modem administrative state
to regulate a particular economic or social activity. Willard Hurst cre-
ated a fabulous course that focused on workplace injuries. Mark
Tushnet has updated and deepened Hurst's materials and teaches them
at Georgetown. At Ohio State and N.Y.U., professors in the first year
develop themes of the regulatory state in connection with a substan-
tive area of law that interests them. Ohio State's Jim Brudney, for
example, teaches his course using issues from labor law; Ruth Coker
draws from anti-discrimination law; but both use theories of legisla-
tion and theories of statutory interpretation. I think it is an excellent
model.
3. Introduction to Legal Methods. A third kind of model is in-
spired by the idea that reasoning from and about statutes is now a
fundamental method of legal analysis in the United States. In the
1940s, Karl Llewellyn and Ed Levi developed a legal methods course
at Chicago; Levi's course had some fine statutory interpretation
problems. Today, a number of law professors have revived this kind
of course, but focus more heavily on statutes and administrative regu-
lations. For example, Jane Ginsburg and Peter Strauss at Columbia
have developed their own materials introducing first-year students to
principles of legal reasoning, with a focus on statutes.
4. Political and Legislative Process. A fourth model focuses on
the political process itself, including the electoral process, the lobby-
ing process, and the legislative deliberative process. These important
issues of law and democracy can be explored at a level of doctrinal
depth and intellectual sophistication not possible twenty years ago,
largely because there has been so much constitutional litigation and
productive theorizing by both political scientists and law professors,
and because Rick Pildes, Pam Karlan, and Sam Issacharoff have pub-
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lished an excellent and influential casebook that draws these theoreti-
cal and doctrinal materials together. 22
5. Clinical Approaches to Legislation. A fifth model teaches
legislation as clinical subject combining theory and practice. Ge-
orgetown's Phil Schrag and a few other professors have experimented
successfully with simulation exercises, such as student legislatures.
The approach that seems more popular today is legislation clinics,
where students work with clients-legislators, administrators, or pri-
vate groups and lobbyists. Yale had a casual program along these
lines in the 1970s. Wally Mlyniec and I pushed for a more formal
program at Georgetown in the 1980s, and Dean Judith Areen estab-
lished a successful legislation clinic there that is now headed by Chai
Feldblum.
6. State and Local Governments. A sixth approach to teaching
legislation is to focus on state and local governments. Most law is
made and enforced at the local level, and the political and legislative
processes work differently at that level. Georgetown's David McCar-
thy and Columbia's Richard Briffault have pioneered courses on state
and local government, and an increasing number of law schools now
have offerings in this area.
As to the future of legislation, well, I am an optimist. This will
continue to be a growth area in a variety of ways. Legislation will be
taught as a survey course at an increasing number of law schools, will
be cannibalized for an increasing number of legal methods courses,
and will continue to generate exciting scholarship, especially as it en-
courages more collaborations between law professors and political
scientists.
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